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Is agency a straightforward and universal feature of human experience? Or is the construction 
of agency (including attention to and memory for people involved in events) guided by patterns 
in culture? In this paper we focus on one aspect of cultural experience: patterns in language. We 
examined English and Japanese speakers’ descriptions of intentional and accidental events. 
English and Japanese speakers described intentional events similarly, using mostly agentive 
language (e.g., “She broke the vase”). However, when it came to accidental events English 
speakers used more agentive language than did Japanese speakers. We then tested whether 
these different patterns found in language may also manifest in cross-cultural differences in 
attention and memory. Results from a non-linguistic memory task showed that English and 
Japanese speakers remembered the agents of intentional events equally well. However, 
English speakers remembered the agents of accidents better than did Japanese speakers, as 
predicted from patterns in language. Further, directly manipulating agency in language during 
another laboratory task changed people’s eye-witness memory, confirming a possible causal 
role for language. Patterns in one’s linguistic environment may promote and support how people 
instantiate agency in context.
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  societies  emphasizing  more  independent  notions  of  self  (e.g., 
Markus and Kitayama, 1991, 2004). Compared to people in inter-
dependent societies, people in independent societies are more 
likely to select a single proximal cause for an event (e.g., Chiu et al., 
2000; Choi et al., 2003), are less aware of distal consequences of 
events (e.g., Maddux and Yuki, 2006), are more susceptible to cor-
respondence bias (e.g., Choi et al., 1999), and are more motivated 
by personal choice (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper, 1999). The role that 
individuals play in events may depend on notions of agency that 
are culture-specific (e.g., Morris et al., 2001). What it means to be 
an “agent” does not appear to be a stable, universal property of 
events in the world. What people see and believe to be an agent is 
constructed in context.
In this paper we ask whether habitual patterns of speaking in 
one’s linguistic community, as well as patterns in one’s immediate 
linguistic context, might also be included among the set of cues for 
constructing notions of agency. In particular, we examine the role 
of language in shaping attention to and memory for individuals 
involved in events (potential agents).
In language, one finds pervasive and systematic ways of constru-
ing and interpreting the world. Patterns in everyday descriptions 
(e.g., whether someone says “He shattered the crystal” or “The crys-
tal shattered”) may serve as pervasive and powerful cues to agency. 
Previous work has demonstrated that such differences in linguistic 
framing can indeed serve as cues to agency and carry serious con-
sequences for how much we blame and punish others (Fausey and 
Boroditsky, in press a). For example, English speakers who read a 
report about Justin Timberlake and Janet Jackson’s wardrobe mal-
function containing the agentive expression “tore the bodice” not 
only blamed Timberlake more, but also levied 53% more in fines for 
IntroductIon
Throughout life, we act on the world around us. We move and 
shake  things,  we  build  and  break  things. And  we  make  many 
inferences about actions and outcomes, deciding who to blame 
for what. Mundane, everyday life may lead us to think that causal 
agency is a natural, straightforward, and universal feature of human 
  experience. Is it?
Consider this scenario: A forklift operator is maneuvering his 
heavy load toward its destination in a crowded warehouse, and as he 
squeezes around a tight turn, the nearest shelf collapses and millions 
of dollars worth of fine crystal comes crashing to the floor. Was the 
operator, the tight turn, the rickety shelf, or the fragile crystal the 
cause? Was collapsing, falling, or shattering the effect?
Previous work in the psychology of agency has revealed that 
“causal agent” is a context-dependent construct, with both physi-
cal and social context playing important roles. For example, in 
visual  cognition,  the  perception  of  physical  causality  is  easily 
altered by minor changes in context. In one set of studies, Scholl 
and Nakayama (2002) showed people videos of an event that could 
be seen either as a ball knocking into another ball thereby launching 
it into motion (a launch) or as a ball passing another stationary ball 
(a pass). They discovered that the visual context in which people 
perceived this ambiguous event mattered. When paired with even a 
momentary glimpse of another launch event in the visual environ-
ment, the event now looked like a clear launch. That is, whether a 
moving object is seen as a causal agent – in the identical physical 
presentation – depends on the surrounding visual context.
Social context also plays an important role. Societies across the 
world instantiate different concepts of the self, with East Asian 
societies emphasizing interdependent ways of being and Western 
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Martinez, 2000; Dorfman, 2004; Filipovic, 2007). For   example, some 
analyses have suggested that the frequency of non-agentive expres-
sions may be higher in Japanese than in English (e.g., Teramura, 
1976; Choi, 2009).
In Japanese, two different verbs are often used for the transitive 
and intransitive description of the same action. These two verbs 
often share the same stem. One example is waru/wareru   
(to  break). An  agentive  use  would  be   ( Tamago-wo 
watta/(I) broke (the) egg). A non-agentive use would be   
(Tamago-ga wareta/(The) egg broke). Other verbs in Japanese have 
the same form for both transitive and intransitive uses, and the 
presence of the particle “ga” attached to the affected object marks 
the non-agentive expression. One example is hiraku   (to open). 
An agentive use would be   (Kare-ga DOA-wo hiraita/
He opened (the) door) and a non-agentive use would be 
(DOA-ga hiraita/(The) door opened).
Verbs are thought to be especially salient in Japanese and typi-
cal verb forms in Japanese may differ from typical verb forms 
in English. For example, Teramura (1976) noted that even when 
an event involves someone who could be described as a causal 
agent (e.g., “He dropped the pen”), it is often more natural in 
Japanese to describe such events using non-agentive expressions 
like “PEN-ga ochiteshimatta” (“(The) pen dropped, unfortunately”), 
or even sentences that include only a verb like “ochiteshimatta” 
(“dropped, unfortunately”). Also, when describing certain kinds 
of causal events (such as when there is a delay between the cause 
and outcome, or when an agent is not visually depicted but may be 
inferred), Japanese speakers are less likely to use transitive expres-
sions compared to speakers of other languages (Bohnemeyer et al., 
2010; Choi, 2009). Further, evidence from patterns of language 
acquisition suggests that early verb use in English may be more 
transitive than early verb use in Japanese, likely due to differ-
ent adult input (e.g., Nomura and Shirai, 1997; Fukuda, 2005; 
Tsujimura, 2006).
Verbs may be especially salient in Japanese because nouns and 
pronouns in Japanese are often optional and inferred from context 
(e.g., Fernald and Morikawa, 1993). The form of the verb may there-
fore be a potent cue for how to frame an event. Might such differ-
ences in event descriptions lead people to construe and remember 
causal events differently?
the plan of the paper
In this paper we focus on one aspect of culture: the typical patterns 
in linguistic event descriptions within a community. In Study 1, 
we compare English and Japanese descriptions of the same causal 
events. We find that English and Japanese descriptions are equally 
agentive when it comes to talking about intentional events, but dif-
fer for accidents: in the case of accidental events Japanese descrip-
tions are less agentive than are English descriptions. In Study 2, 
we ask whether these patterns in linguistic descriptions may also 
manifest in patterns of eye-witness memory. We find that English 
and Japanese speakers remember the agents of intentional events 
equally well, but in the case of accidental events English speakers 
are more likely to remember the individuals potentially constru-
able as agents than are Japanese speakers. (Note: Our two groups of 
participants are native English-speaking residents of the USA, and 
native Japanese-speaking residents of Japan, as described in more 
the offense than those who read the non-agentive “the bodice tore.” 
The linguistic framing had a big effect on blame and punishment 
even when people watched a video of the event and were able to 
witness the tearing with their own eyes. In this paper, we explore 
the role of such patterns in language in shaping attention to and 
memory for individuals involved in events.
a role for language?
We talk about the events of our days, often discussing who did 
what to whom. We talk to our children, we update our bosses, 
we negotiate with friends and colleagues. We learn from other 
people’s stories. A huge proportion of what we know about the 
world comes to us through the medium of language. Human 
language use is exquisitely structured and systematic, and as 
a result our conversations carry many regularities in how we 
communicate “what happened.” Could patterns in language 
help shape whether we construe someone as being the agent 
of an event and whether we attend to and remember who 
was involved?
The influence of language on cognition and behavior has been 
demonstrated in many domains. For example, linguistic framing or 
labeling changes how people perceive emotion (e.g., Barrett et al., 
2007), represent objects (e.g., Lupyan, 2008) and remember events 
(e.g., Loftus and Palmer, 1974; Gentner and Loftus, 1979; Billman 
and Krych, 1998). Further, people are sensitive to how often certain 
expressions are used within their linguistic community (Saffran 
et al., 1996; Landauer and Dumais, 1997; Gahl and Garnsey, 2004) 
and speakers of different languages talk about events differently 
(e.g., Gentner and Goldin-Meadow, 2003). Language directs atten-
tion (e.g., Reali et al., 2006; Richardson and Matlock, 2007) and 
through repeated use may guide habitual event construals (e.g., 
Slobin, 1996).
Indeed, research in the tradition of linguistic relativity has sug-
gested that habitual ways of talking influence how people think 
about colors (e.g., Roberson and Hanley, 2007; Winawer et al., 
2007), space (e.g., Levinson et al., 2002), objects (e.g., Lucy, 1992; 
Imai and Gentner, 1997; Boroditsky et al., 2003; Dilkina et al., 2007) 
and events (Slobin, 1996, 2003; Finkbeiner et al., 2002; Gennari 
et al., 2002; Oh, 2003; Papafragou et al., 2008; Wolff et al., 2009; 
Trueswell and Papafragou, 2010).
Could language also play a role in how people construct agency 
and attend to and remember the potential agents of events? In this 
paper, we identify cross-linguistic differences in how English and 
Japanese speakers describe the same events, and find that there are 
corresponding cross-linguistic differences in eye-witness memory.
agentIvIty In language
You see someone accidentally brush against a flower vase and the 
vase ends up in pieces on the floor. When asked about what hap-
pened, you might say, “She broke the vase.” In English, agentive 
descriptions like this are typical and appropriate even for clearly 
accidental events. By contrast, non-agentive language often sounds 
evasive (e.g., Reagan’s famous “mistakes were made” in the 1987 
State of the Union Address).
Linguistic analyses suggest that in other languages, non-agentive 
expressions are more frequent and are used to distinguish accidental 
from intentional actions (Slobin and Bocaz, 1988; Maldonado, 1992; www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  3
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Participants were selected to be functionally monolingual. All 
participants reported that the target language was their native lan-
guage. English speakers reported learning only English before age 
12. Exposure to English in Japan is almost inevitable, including in 
school before age 12. Thus, we selected Japanese speakers based on 
their self-rated proficiency speaking and understanding English. 
Using a 5-point scale in which 5 indicated “native-like,” Japanese 
speakers who rated themselves as 3 or lower for an English profi-
ciency measure were included1.
Materials
Participants  read  instructions  in  either  English  or  Japanese. 
Instructions in the two languages were developed simultaneously 
and verified by an independent Japanese-English bilingual.
Videos of intentional and accidental versions of 16 unique 
events were used (Table 1). In all events, a man physically inter-
acted with an object. The man’s reaction differed between the 
intentional and accidental versions of the event. For example, 
in the intentional version of the pencil breaking event, a man 
who was seated at a desk picked up a pencil, deliberately broke 
it in half and looked satisfied. In the accidental version of this 
event, a man was writing, and while writing the pencil broke in 
half. In this case, the man showed a startle response and threw 
his hands up in surprise. Thus, the accidental events were char-
acterized by a “whoops!” reaction such as a startle response, sur-
prised facial expressions and/or surprised hand gestures. Videos 
of eight events (both intentional and accidental versions) featured 
an actor in a black shirt and videos of another eight events (both 
intentional and accidental versions) featured a different actor in 
a white shirt.
Videos in this study featured Japanese actors. In cross-  cultural 
research  about  attention  to  human  agents,  one  necessarily 
confronts potential challenges in interpreting patterns due to 
detail in the methods. Because our studies focus on the dimension 
of language, for brevity we refer to our participants as English 
speakers and Japanese speakers.)
In Study 3, we ask whether patterns in one’s local linguistic 
context can help shift attention toward or away from individuals 
who might be construed as agents. We take inspiration from previ-
ous work in social psychology that has used short-term linguistic 
manipulations to instantiate different models of construing events 
in the world (for example, research on self-theories by Dweck and 
colleagues, e.g., Chiu et al., 1997). Before testing English speakers 
on their memory for the individuals involved in events (as in the 
previous study), we exposed them to either a set of agentive or non-
agentive linguistic expressions (that were unrelated to the events 
that they would later need to remember). We reasoned that hear-
ing many non-agentive expressions (e.g., “The toast burned,” “The 
necklace unfastened”) should draw people’s attention away from 
agents, while hearing agentive expressions (e.g., “He burned the 
toast,” “He unfastened the necklace”) should put attention squarely 
on agents. We find that manipulating the local linguistic environ-
ment in this way can indeed shift attention with respect to agency: 
English speakers remembered the individuals involved in causal 
events better when they were primed with unrelated agentive than 
with unrelated non-agentive expressions.
Study 1
In  Study  1,  English  and  Japanese  speakers  watched  videos  of 
intentional and accidental events and provided descriptions of 
these events.
Method
Participants
Fifty-eight  English  speakers  (mean  age  =  33.38  years)  and  22 
Japanese speakers (mean age = 23.59 years) participated. English 
speakers completed the study via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service 
(mturk.com) and Japanese speakers were recruited from a com-
munity sample in Tokyo, Japan.
Table 1 | Causal event stimuli.
Action  Intentional  Accidental
Crumple can  Crumples can on floor by stepping on it  Turns to walk and crumples can on floor by stepping on it
Knock box  Faces table, knocks box off table  While gesturing, knocks box off table, reaches to grab it
Knock cups  Faces cup tower, swipes, knocks down tower  Faces cup tower, reaches for a cup, knocks down tower
Close book  Reading book, then turns head, closes book  Reading book, then turns to look at something, closes book
Rip paper  Sits at table, rips page from notebook  Sits at table, turns page in notebook and rips it
Turn off light  Using hand, hits switch and turns off light  By leaning against wall, hits switch and turns off light
Spill rice  Pours rice into a measuring cup  While pouring rice into a measuring cup, spills rice
Crack egg  Takes egg from carton, cracks it against bowl  As picking up egg from carton, cracks it against bowl
Close drawer  Sits at desk with open drawer, closes with knee  Turning toward desk with open drawer, closes with knee
Pop balloon  Pops balloon using tack  Reaches to put tack in container, pops balloon during reach
Open umbrella  Stands with closed umbrella, then opens it  Stands with closed umbrella, jumps back as opens it
Open door  By turning doorknob, opens door  By leaning too hard against door, opens it and stumbles
Drop keys  Drops keys onto table  Attempts to put keys on table, but drops them on floor
Break pencil  Sits at table, breaks pencil in half  Sits at table, breaks pencil in half while writing
Stick sticker  Places nametag sticker on shirt  Flops arm onto table without looking, then sticker is on arm
Release balloon  Sits among balloons, releases one that is untied  Sits among balloons, releases one, reaches to grab it
1Data from four additional participants who failed to meet the language background 
criteria were not analyzed.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cultural Psychology    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  4
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popped-intransitive was surprised). Some non-agentive descriptions 
took the form “Someone was doing X and then Y happened,” in which 
the agent was linguistically separated from a change-of-state event 
that was described intransitively.
Across all participants, 6.33% of descriptions did not describe 
the event and were excluded from analyses. All descriptions were 
coded by two independent raters, with high point-to-point reli-
ability (99.14% English, 97.44% Japanese). Disagreements were 
resolved upon discussion2.
Results are shown in Figures 1 and 2A. Intentional events were 
described equally agentively by both English and Japanese speak-
ers [English M = 97.12, SE = 0.75; Japanese M = 97.00, SE = 1.21, 
t(76) = 0.09, n.s.]. Accidental events, on the other hand, were more 
often described agentively by English speakers than by Japanese 
speakers [English M = 69.24, SE = 2.62; Japanese M = 51.69, 
SE = 4.49, t(76) = 3.48, p = 0.001, d = 0.88].
To compare how strongly speakers distinguished between inten-
tional and accidental events in their descriptions, we computed a 
difference score for each participant as the proportion of intentional 
events described using agentive language minus the proportion of 
accidental events described using agentive language. This distinction 
was more pronounced for Japanese speakers (M = 45.31, SE = 4.28) 
than for English speakers (M = 27.89, SE = 2.62), t(76) = 3.51, 
p = 0.001, d = 0.88. This cross-linguistic difference was also consistent 
across events, as revealed by comparing the difference scores for each 
event in English and in Japanese, paired t(15) = 2.96, p = 0.013.
  possible cross-race recognition effects (e.g., Malpass and Kravitz, 
1969) – in many cases, either the exact stimuli or the “same race” 
status is held constant across the two groups, but not both at the 
same time. In the current studies, the nature of the interaction 
design mitigates against these concerns because all participants 
attempt to describe (and in Study 2, remember) two kinds of 
events (intentional and accidental) and it is the relationship 
between these two kinds of events within each community that 
is of interest.
Procedure
Participants watched 16 videos and were asked to provide a lin-
guistic description for each video. In each description trial, par-
ticipants viewed a video and then answered the question “What 
happened?”  ( ).  Participants  typed  their 
responses at their own pace and received no feedback.
Each video showed a different event; half featured the actor in 
black and half the actor in white, half were intentional actions and 
half accidental. Whether an event was presented in its intentional or 
accidental version was counterbalanced across participants. Videos 
were presented in random order.
reSultS
Descriptions were coded as agentive if the sentence described the 
change-of-state event using a transitive expression. A canonical 
agentive description would be “He popped the balloon.” Descriptions 
were coded as non-agentive if the change-of-state event was described 
intransitively. A canonical non-agentive description would be “The 
balloon popped.” In Japanese, non-agentive descriptions were char-
acterized by an intransitive verb as well as the particle “ga” with 
the affected object (e.g.,  , Balloon-ga 
FIgure 1 | Distributions of causal event descriptions in english and Japanese. (A) Intentional, (B) accidental, (C) difference (Intentional minus Accidental). 
Histograms (with proportion of the sample on the y-axis) of the proportion of agentive language use in each language community are plotted.
2 Two participants (both English) were excluded from subsequent analyses because 
over a third of their descriptions did not describe the event.
3All conclusions are also supported by non-parametric analyses (Mann–Whitney 
U-test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks).www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  5
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non-linguistic behavior is a necessary first step in developing any 
theory about habitual framing effects. The next step, of course, 
would be to show that language itself may play a causal role, which 
is addressed in Study 3.
Study 2
Method
Participants
Sixty-two  English  speakers  (Stanford  University;  Mean 
age = 19.29 years) and 70 Japanese speakers (Keio University, 
Jochi University, Tokyo Kogyo University, Surugadai Law School, 
in Tokyo, Japan; Mean age = 20.94 years) received course credit or 
were paid for their participation. Participants were selected to be 
under 25 years old to ensure a homogenous sample for memory 
performance. All participants were monolingual, by the same 
criteria used in Study 1. None of the participants had taken part 
in Study 1.
General design
Participants read instructions in either English or Japanese. All 
participants  completed  two  tasks,  first  an  Object-orientation 
memory task and then an Agent memory task. The first task was 
designed to allow participants to acclimate to laboratory memory 
tasks and also to serve as a measure of memory performance 
that is unrelated to eye-witness memory. The second task was 
designed  to  test  for  differences  in  non-linguistic  eye-witness 
memory (memory for the agents of events) between English and 
Japanese speakers. The two tasks were non-linguistic measures 
of memory – participants never described any of the images or 
events during these two tasks, nor were they provided with any 
linguistic descriptions.
dIScuSSIon
English and Japanese speakers described intentional events simi-
larly but differed in their descriptions of accidental events. This 
pattern in language suggests a specific prediction: If English speak-
ers are more likely than Japanese speakers to describe accidents 
agentively, might they also pay more attention to and be more 
likely to remember the individuals involved in accidental events? 
The patterns in language predict no differences between the two 
groups for intentional events, but more attention to potential agents 
for English speakers in the case of accidental events.
Previous work has examined the role of linguistic framing in 
eye-witness memory within a language by presenting participants 
with different descriptions of the same event, for example vary-
ing the vividness of verbs, and measuring effects on memory 
(e.g., Loftus and Palmer, 1974; Gentner and Loftus, 1979). The 
studies here extend this work to the cross-linguistic domain and 
examine memory for agents. Instead of giving participants dif-
ferent descriptions of the same event, we ask whether speakers 
of two different languages that would typically describe an event 
differently would naturally pay attention to, encode, and remem-
ber different aspects of the same event. That is, are members of 
different culturo-linguistic communities habitually operating 
in different framing conditions as a function of the patterns 
in language?
Habitual  linguistic  framing  may  be  a  powerful  mechanism 
by which cultural values are propagated. In Study 2, we test for 
whether patterns in language are also evident in patterns in mem-
ory. Importantly, we test for cross-cultural differences in mem-
ory for causal events in a task where participants are not asked 
to describe the events at any time before or during the memory 
task. Establishing that there are similar patterns in linguistic and 
FIgure 2 | Describing and remembering agents in english and Japanese. (A) Causal event descriptions, with the mean proportion of agentive descriptions 
plotted on the y-axis, (B) causal agent memory, with mean proportion correct plotted on the y-axis. Error bars are ±1 SEM.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cultural Psychology    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  6
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reSultS: eye-wItneSS MeMory In englISh and JapaneSe
Eleven participants were excluded from analyses for one of the fol-
lowing reasons: (a) chance performance on the object-orientation 
memory task (three Japanese), (b) a z-score greater than |2| (relative 
to language group) on the Memory Difference Score (Intentional 
Memory minus Accidental Memory) (four English, four Japanese). 
The Memory Difference Score was the analysis of interest in this 
study, and we wanted to be sure that outliers did not drive any 
observed cross-linguistic differences.
Results are shown in Figure 2B5. Intentional agents were remem-
bered well by both English (M = 71.55, SE = 2.57) and Japanese 
(M = 70.44, SE = 2.32) speakers, t(119) = 0.32, n.s. However, as pre-
dicted, accidental agents were better remembered by English speak-
ers (M = 73.06, SE = 2.42) than by Japanese speakers (M = 66.07, 
SE = 2.67), t(119) = 1.93, p = 0.028, d = 0.35. As predicted by pat-
terns in language, the distinction between memory for individuals 
involved in intentional and accidental events was more pronounced 
for Japanese speakers (M = 4.37, SE = 2.06) than for English speak-
ers (M = −1.51, SE = 1.97), t(119) = 2.05, p = 0.02, d = 0.37. This 
difference remains robust when participants’ memory performance 
on the object-orientation task is added as a covariate in the analysis 
(p = 0.023) ensuring that this observed cross-linguistic difference in 
agent memory is not simply due to more general differences in mem-
ory performance. Importantly, the agent memory task itself serves as 
the crucial control that guards against concerns about overall memory 
differences between the two groups: English and Japanese speakers 
remembered intentional agents equally well. They only differed in 
their memory for individuals involved in accidental events.
dIScuSSIon
In Studies 1 and 2, English speakers and Japanese speakers used 
agentive expressions to talk about intentional events and remem-
bered intentional agents equally well. When it came to accidents, 
however, cross-cultural differences in both linguistic descriptions 
and eye-witness memory were observed. English speakers described 
accidents using more agentive language than Japanese speakers did 
and also remembered the individuals involved in accidents better 
than Japanese speakers did. Importantly, these memory patterns 
were observed in a non-linguistic memory task: participants were 
not asked to describe events, nor were the events described for them 
at any point before or during the memory task.
Cross-cultural differences in memory patterns were localized 
to a particular kind of event (accidents). Given other findings 
about cross-cultural differences in attention (e.g., Masuda and 
Nisbett, 2001), other patterns of results might have been pre-
dicted. For example, global differences in Japanese and English 
speakers’ attention – such as relative attention to context versus 
focal objects – might have led to overall lower memory for causal 
agents in Japanese speakers compared to English speakers. Cross-
linguistic differences in noun and pronoun use (with lower fre-
quency in Japanese compared to English) might also have resulted 
in overall lower agent memory in Japanese speakers. Instead, we 
found evidence for memory differences only for those events in 
which patterns of action descriptions also differed. Thus, this 
obJect-orIentatIon MeMory
During encoding, participants saw pictures of 15 objects presented 
on a computer screen one at a time for two seconds each (images 
courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Brown University, http://www.tarrlab.
org/). Each object appeared in one of three possible orientations, 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed 
to pay attention to the images and were told that their memory 
would be tested.
After the encoding phase, participants were given a brief dis-
tracter task (counting the number of white squares on a grid of 
black and white squares), followed by the memory test. For the 
memory test, participants were shown the three possible orienta-
tions of each object and asked to indicate which one they had 
seen previously.
agent MeMory
Video materials
For the encoding phase, the same videos were used as in Study 1. 
For the test phase, we used an additional set of videos showing 
all the same events but with actions performed by a new, third 
actor. The same silent videos served as stimuli for both English 
and Japanese speakers.
Encoding
During the encoding phase, participants viewed 16 videos, each 
showing a different event (half featured the actor in white and half 
the actor in black, half were intentional actions and half accidental). 
Whether an event was presented in its intentional or accidental 
version was counterbalanced across participants. Videos were pre-
sented in one of two pseudo-random orders that ensured that no 
more than three videos of the same agent or the same intention 
appeared in a row.
Participants were instructed to pay attention to the videos and 
were told that their memory would be tested, but were not given 
any further clues. After viewing all 16 videos (once each, with a 
1200 ms pause between videos), participants were instructed to 
count to 10 as a brief distracter task.
Test
Test trials consisted of a probe video followed by still photos of 
the two agents from the encoding phase. In the probe videos, a 
third actor appeared as the agent of the same events participants 
saw during encoding. For example, if a participant had seen the 
“accidental balloon popping” event during encoding, they would 
see this same event acted by the new agent in the test phase. After 
each probe video, participants were asked, “Who did it the first 
time?”  ( )4  and  responded  by 
pressing a key associated with the side of the screen of either the 
white-shirt man or the black-shirt man. Participants were tested 
only on the events they had seen during encoding, presented in 
a different pseudo-random order from the encoding phase, and 
received no feedback.
4 45  participants  received  this  wording;  25  participants  received  the  wording 
 We used the second phrasing after discussions with 
several native Japanese speakers revealed differing opinions about the best transla-
tion for the English question. Question wording did not interact with patterns of 
memory for intentional versus accidental agents and so data were pooled.
5 Results from Study 1 motivate directed predictions and so one-tailed planned con-
trasts are reported.www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  7
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Presumably, any “chronic” influence of language on attention 
and memory results from a combination of many shorter-term 
episodes of linguistic descriptions of events. It is therefore useful 
to examine the role of a relatively “temporary” manipulation of 
the language environment. This study is one step toward estab-
lishing a more direct link between agentivity in language and eye-
witness memory. If patterns in one’s linguistic environment can 
bias eye-witness memory, then directly manipulating the frequency 
of agentive expressions in the local linguistic environment should 
modulate English speakers’ memory for agents.
Method
Participants
Sixty-five English speakers (33 agentive prime, 32 non-agentive 
prime) participated. Inclusion criteria were the same as in the pre-
vious studies.
General design
Participants completed three tasks: first the same object-orientation 
memory task as in Study 2, then the linguistic priming task described 
below, and finally the same agent memory task as in Study 2 (except with 
Caucasian actors; see Fausey and Boroditsky, in press b, for specific event 
stimuli). The procedure was identical to the cross-linguistic eye-witness 
memory paradigm except for the inserted linguistic priming task.
Linguistic priming task
Participants in each condition listened to 24 sentences, either all 
agentive (e.g., He burned the toast) or all non-agentive (e.g., The 
toast burned) (Table 2). As participants heard each sentence, two 
study may help refine our understanding of cross-cultural differ-
ences in   attention to events and suggests that patterns in verb use 
may be one mechanism that drives these differences.
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 raise an important question: Can 
patterns in language per se shape people’s attention to agents? There are 
many differences between the life experiences of English and Japanese 
speakers beyond the languages that they speak, so it is possible that 
other extra-linguistic cultural differences created the memory dif-
ference we observed in the previous study. For example, it is possible 
that members of some cultural groups learn to not gawk at others 
in embarrassing or unfortunate circumstances (of which accidents 
would be a good example). If one group of participants diverted their 
attention when they saw an accident in order to be polite, this could 
also explain the pattern of results in Study 2. Are patterns in language 
indeed among the causal factors that can create the kinds of differences 
in eye-witness memory that we observed in Study 2?
It seems likely that language and other extra-linguistic aspects of cul-
ture work in concert to instantiate and maintain habits of thought. One 
approach to testing for the role of language is to look across cultures to 
find other linguistic systems that contrast in agentive language use and 
test if correspondences in eye-witness memory emerge. We have con-
ducted one such set of studies comparing English and Spanish speakers 
on the same description and eye-witness memory tasks described here 
(Fausey and Boroditsky, in press b). Spanish descriptions of accidental 
events tend to be less agentive than English descriptions, and Spanish 
speakers correspondingly remember the individuals involved in acci-
dents less well than do English speakers, replicating the pattern of dif-
ferences we see between English and Japanese. Of course, these results 
do not in any way rule out or diminish the potential contributions of 
other non-linguistic aspects of culture. But they do at least help confirm 
that when patterns in language differ, there are corresponding differ-
ences in cognition. The directions of causation, however, remain an 
open question. Do different cultural ways of thinking lead to different 
patterns in languages, or the other way around, or both?
To more directly test whether patterns in language per se can 
cause people to pay more or less attention to agents, we conducted a 
third study. Previous work in social psychology has used short-term 
linguistic manipulations to instantiate different modes of thinking. 
For example, Chiu et al. (1997) identified a set of important behav-
ioral differences that stem from differences in people’s implicit 
self-theories, and then demonstrated that explicitly manipulating 
such self-theories can change behavior.
We apply this logic to the current set of questions to determine 
whether exposure to agentive or non-agentive language can indeed 
encourage different patterns in eye-witness memory for individuals 
involved in events. Before testing English speakers on their memory 
for events (as in the previous study), we exposed them to either a set 
of agentive or non-agentive linguistic expressions (that were unrelated 
to the events that they would later need to remember). We reasoned 
that hearing many non-agentive expressions (e.g., “The toast burned,” 
“The necklace unfastened”) should draw people’s attention away from 
agents, while hearing agentive expressions (e.g., “He burned the toast,” 
“He unfastened the necklace”) should direct attention toward agents.
Study 3
In Study 3, we exposed English speakers to either agentive or non-
agentive language in a separate task before they completed an agent 
memory task.
Table 2 | Prime sentences (english speakers).
Agentive  Non-agentive
He wore out the shoe.  The shoe wore out.
He shrunk the shirt.  The shirt shrunk.
He ignited the grill.  The grill ignited.
He unfastened the necklace.  The necklace unfastened.
He crashed the car.  The car crashed.
He squirted the ketchup.  The ketchup squirted.
He cooked the chicken.  The chicken cooked.
He dried the flowers.  The flowers dried.
He burned the toast.  The toast burned.
He bent the clip.  The clip bent.
He started up the computer.  The computer started up.
He loosened the hinge.  The hinge loosened.
He unbuttoned the jeans.  The jeans unbuttoned.
He scattered the cards.  The cards scattered.
He shut down the laptop.  The laptop shut down.
He splattered the paint.  The paint splattered.
He melted the ice cream.  The ice cream melted.
He boiled the water.  The water boiled.
He unwound the yoyo.  The yoyo unwound.
He straightened the slinky.  The slinky straightened.
He lowered the chair.  The chair lowered.
He crumbled the cookie.  The cookie crumbled.
He unfolded the lawn chair.  The lawn chair unfolded.
He blew out the match.  The match blew out.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cultural Psychology    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  8
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dIScuSSIon
It appears that the local linguistic environment can influence how 
well people remember who did what: English speakers who were 
exposed to agentive language in the priming task remembered 
agents better than those who were exposed to non-agentive lan-
guage. This was true even though the particular verbs used in 
the priming task were unrelated to the actions that participants 
observed in the agent memory task. This result confirms a pos-
sible causal role for the linguistic environment in guiding eye-
witness memory.
general dIScuSSIon
Results from three studies demonstrate that our eye-witness mem-
ories for even such momentary events as popping a balloon or 
breaking a pencil may be susceptible to influence from patterns in 
culture. In particular, we find that patterns in the language use of 
two cultural groups predict patterns in eye-witness memory in the 
two groups. Further, manipulating the local linguistic environment 
created the predicted shift in eye-witness memory, lending support 
to a causal role for language.
How important are the cross-cultural differences we find? One 
way to compose an answer is quantitatively: the effect sizes are 
in the typical range for eye-witness identification research and 
qualify as small to medium in terms of Cohen’s d. The difference 
in memory for accidental events between the two groups is 7% (this 
constitutes 14% of the effective measurement range). Of course, 
the importance of any difference one might observe depends on 
what is at stake. If a US presidential election were won by 7% of 
the vote, such a difference would be considered a landslide. In this 
case, the results are important because the measure is eye-witness 
memory, a measure that in the real-world can make the difference 
between life in prison and getting away with murder, between being 
falsely accused or exonerated. Further, attention to and memory 
for who did what is one of the ingredients of the construct of 
agency, a construct of paramount importance in human cognition 
and motivation.
It is important to note that remembering individuals involved 
in accidental events is not inherently a good or a bad thing to 
do. Placing attention on individuals involved in accidents may 
improve memory for those individuals, but it may also undermine 
memory for other details of the situation or context and may 
invite undue punishment (or undue reward in the case of positive 
accidental outcomes) on those who were not acting intention-
ally. Research demonstrating differences does not license us to 
place a value on any given cognitive skill. Such attributions of 
value necessarily depend on culturally and situationally relevant 
goals and can only be constructed with respect to cultural and 
social context.
One interesting feature of these findings is that cross-cultural 
differences in eye-witness memory were observed even in a non-
linguistic task, one that did not linguistically frame the events 
for   participants and did not require participants to talk about 
the events. Previous studies on the role of language in event 
cognition have found cross-linguistic differences in how people 
encode and reason about motion events (e.g., Finkbeiner et al., 
2002; Gennari et al., 2002; Oh, 2003; Slobin, 2003; Papafragou 
et al., 2008; Trueswell and Papafragou, 2010), though some find 
related images (e.g., a piece of bread and a burned piece of bread) 
were presented on a computer screen. The participants’ task was 
to click on the image described by the sentence (e.g., the burned 
bread). The same response was correct regardless of priming condi-
tion. Stimuli were presented in random order. All sentences were 
recorded by a female native English speaker and were played to 
participants via computer speakers. Importantly, no verbs that 
could describe actions in the agent memory task were used in the 
priming task.
After completing these trials, participants were given a surprise 
recall test and asked to write down as many sentences as they could 
remember6. They then continued on to complete the agent memory 
task. The priming manipulation was designed to change the overall 
frequency of agentive versus non-agentive expressions in the par-
ticipants’ linguistic environment and to produce a “main effect” of 
linguistic environment: exposure to agentive language should lead 
people to have better overall memory for agents than exposure to 
non-agentive language.
reSultS
Five participants were excluded from analyses for one of the fol-
lowing reasons: (a) chance performance on the object-orientation 
memory task (1 agentive, 2 non-agentive), (b) ungrammatical or 
infelicitous language use (1 agentive, 1 non-agentive).
As  predicted,  participants  primed  with  agentive  language 
showed better memory for agents (M = 78.02, SE = 2.93) than 
those primed with non-agentive language (M = 70.69, SE = 3.07), 
t(58) = 1.73, p < 0.05 (one-tailed), d = 0.45 (Figure 3). This was 
not simply a function of the non-agentive group being worse at 
memory overall. Participants in the two conditions remembered 
object-orientation equally well (agentive M = 71.40, SE = 2.38; 
non-agentive M = 75.63, SE = 2.50), t(58) = 1.23, n.s. There was 
no main effect of event type or interaction of prime by event type. 
The effect of prime condition on memory was also reliable across 
items, t(15) = 3.04, p < 0.01.
FIgure 3 | remembering agents after agentive or non-agentive 
linguistic primes. Mean proportion correct is plotted on the y-axis. Error bars 
are ±1 SEM.
6Participants recalled about half of the prime sentences that they had heard. The 
amount recalled did not differ for those primed with agentive language (M = 41.53, 
SE = 1.65) and those primed with non-agentive language (M = 45.83, SE = 2.24), 
t(58) = 1.56, n.s.www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  9
Fausey et al.  Constructing agency
Such patterns in language and thought can emerge over time 
through iterative mutual influences of linguistic and extra-linguis-
tic forces that support and reinforce each other. For example, as 
demonstrated in Study 3, hearing non-agentive language leads to 
poorer memory for who was involved in events. And if people 
remember less about who was involved, they will in turn be less 
likely to talk about them, reinforcing and strengthening the pattern 
in language, and so on.
Alternatively, the process could start because of a visual norm 
that diverts people’s attention away from individuals involved in 
accidents (perhaps because it is deemed impolite to look at peo-
ple in embarrassing or unfortunate circumstances). This would 
in turn lead to worse eye-witness memory for potential agents, 
and may manifest in norms in language use. Not mentioning the 
potential agent could be the linguistic version of “looking away” 
when describing an event. If this linguistic “looking away” pattern 
becomes customary, the practice of “looking away” could spread 
not only to events that we ourselves witness (and could physically 
look away from), but to all events we hear about or retell to oth-
ers. This linguistic norm would support, reinforce, preserve and 
distribute the visual “looking away” norm. The results of Study 
3 suggest that local patterns of “looking away” in one’s linguistic 
environment can indeed shift patterns in subsequent memory for 
individuals involved in events.
Of course, not all cultural norms need be reflected in language, and 
not all features of language need to be tied to other cultural norms. 
Languages may develop features to satisfy a variety of other commu-
nicative and cognitive constraints, and many changes over time may 
simply be a function of non-directed drift. Features that develop in 
the language system guided by these other constraints could also start 
off a chain of events in cultural change, shifting attentional patterns 
and becoming integrated into other extra-linguistic behavioral norms 
according to the same mechanisms as described above. Of course, not 
all features of languages may have measurable cognitive consequences. 
Understanding when patterns in language will yield effects on thinking 
and when they will not is the next frontier for this area of research.
future dIrectIonS
Blame and punishment
Beyond  differences  in  eye-witness  memory,  previous  work  in 
English has shown that alternations between agentive and non-
agentive descriptions can have important consequences for how 
much we blame and punish others (Fausey and Boroditsky, in 
press a). Whether cross-linguistic differences in event descriptions 
lead to corresponding differences in blame and punishment is an 
open question for future research.
First-person versus observed agency
A further interesting question for future research is whether simi-
lar patterns emerge for events experienced from a first-person 
perspective. In this paper, we examined patterns of description 
and eye-witness memory for observed events. How do people talk 
about and remember accidents in which they themselves were a 
potential agent?
Classic social psychological findings suggest that people more 
readily attribute blame to intrinsic “person” factors for events that 
they observe but to extrinsic “situation” factors for events that they 
such differences only when people are explicitly instructed to 
describe the events during the task (e.g., Gennari et al., 2002; 
Papafragou et al., 2008). The influence of patterns in language 
may cut deeper for causal events because observers must inte-
grate both physical and social cues in order to construe what 
happened. That is, causal events may require more cognitive 
construal than motion events and therefore be especially suscep-
tible to linguistic and other cultural influences. Given the criti-
cal role of eye-witness memory performance in many settings 
(e.g., criminal trials), it is important to uncover under which 
circumstances cultural experience guides how people encode 
and remember events.
InterrelatIonShIpS between language and other aSpectS of 
culture
Influences of language and culture are sometimes pitted against 
each other as competing forces. For example, one might ask “Are 
the effects we’re observing here effects of language or culture?” We 
find this formulation of the question to be ill-formed. Language is 
one part of culture. That is, language and culture are not competi-
tors, they have a subset-superset relationship. Further, language 
and other aspects of culture do not act in isolation, they mutually 
influence and reinforce each other.
Languages, of course, are cultural creations: they are incredibly 
intricate and structured tools that we shape and hone to suit our needs. 
Building a culturally-important pattern into a linguistic system is a 
terrific way to ensure its longevity across generations, ensure universal 
distribution within the culture, and provide a constant cognitive sup-
port system for maintaining the cultural value in the moment.
Language is good for preserving cultural values in the long term 
because while the structures of language are constantly changing, 
they change relatively slowly: it is rare to see sudden large-scale 
shifts like the abolition of a canonical word order or the resurgence 
of archaic grammatical cases. Maintaining a culturally-important 
feature in language use is a good way to ensure its longevity. Further, 
language ensures universal distribution because learning to speak 
one’s language is a non-optional part of growing up to be a full-
fledged participant in a culture. This ensures that any cultural value 
manifest in language will receive universal distribution within 
the culture.
Finally, language acts as a constant maintenance and cognitive 
support system because communicating with language (and in 
some cases talking to ourselves) is a pervasive and ubiquitous part 
of human experience. If a cultural norm becomes enshrined in 
noun morphology, for example, then that norm will necessarily 
be instantiated and reinforced whenever a noun is used. Because 
we use language to talk about so much of our experience, cultural 
influences through language could end up having pervasive effects 
throughout the cognitive system.
One attractive aspect of studying culture through the lens of 
language is that because language use is richly structured, it is pos-
sible to make precise measurements of patterns in language use, 
and make specific falsifiable predictions for potential cross-cultural 
differences. For example, in the case explored in this paper, the pat-
terns in language use observed in Study 1 predict different memory 
patterns for intentional and accidental events, and this prediction is 
indeed borne out in the eye-witness memory data in Study 2.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cultural Psychology    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  10
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concluSIon
Results of three experiments suggest that our eye-witness memo-
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differences may be instantiated and supported by patterns in the 
languages we speak. We find that speakers of different languages 
remember different things about the same events. Whether or not 
one is likely to remember who did what appears to pattern with how 
such events are normally described in one’s language community as 
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  experience (e.g., Jones and Nisbett, 1972). On this account, people 
might talk about their own accidents less agentively than they would 
talk about other people’s accidents. Would both English and Japanese 
speakers be more likely to focus on the situation of first-person events, 
using less agentive language to describe them and remembering less 
about their own actions compared to situational details? If so, cross-
cultural variation may remain, just with lower levels of agentive lan-
guage and memory overall than in the current studies.
However, the very distinction between observed and experienced 
events may vary across cultures. Some evidence suggests that this 
distinction may be less pronounced in interdependent cultures com-
pared to independent cultures. For example, the actor-observer effect 
described above appears to be attenuated in East Asians compared to 
Americans (e.g., Choi and Nisbett, 1998; Choi et al., 1999). Further, 
when recalling events in which they were involved, Americans “view” 
the event (in their mind’s eye) from the first-person perspective but 
East Asians view it from a third-person perspective (e.g., Cohen 
and Gunz, 2002). That is, East Asians “observe” (themselves) even 
in experienced events. Thus, first-person perspective events might 
reduce the agentivity of English speakers’ descriptions and memory 
but not that of Japanese speakers.
the role of culturo-lInguIStIc context
Much evidence from cross-national comparisons as well as from 
priming studies has demonstrated that cultural context can influ-
ence a wide range of behaviors (see Oyserman and Lee, 2008, for 
one review). An additional source of evidence comes from research 
showing that bicultural individuals can behave more like members 
of one culture or another, depending on which culture is cued in 
the testing context. For example, bicultural individuals in Hong 
Kong were more likely to attribute outcomes to situational causes 
after seeing Chinese icons than after seeing American icons (e.g., 
Hong et al., 2000). In addition to extra-linguistic cultural cues, 
linguistic context can also guide how bicultural bilinguals behave. 
For example, linguistic context can bias what bilinguals recall from 
events in their own lives as well as from general semantic informa-www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 162  |  11
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